Sigma Converter¶
LimaCharlie is happy to contribute to the Sigma Project by maintaining the LimaCharlie Backend for Sigma, enabling most Sigma rules to be converted to the Detection & Response rule format.
A LimaCharlie Service is available to apply many of those converted rules with a single click to an Organization.
For cases where you either have your own Sigma rules, or you would like to convert/apply specific rules yourself, the Sigma Converter service described below can help streamline the process.
Converter Service¶
The Converter service converts one or many Sigma rules into the LimaCharlie rule format. It can accomplish this via the following HTTPS endpoints available at https://sigma.limacharlie.io/:
Single Rule¶
Endpoint: https://sigma.limacharlie.io/convert/rule
Verb: POST
Form Parameters:
rule: the content of a literal Sigma rule to be converted.target: optional target within LimaCharlie, one ofedr(default) orartifact. Output Example:
{
"rule": "detect:\n events:\n - NEW_PROCESS\n - EXISTING_PROCESS\n op: and\n rules:\n - op: is windows\n - op: or\n rules:\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: domainlist\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: trustdmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: dcmodes\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: adinfo\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: ' dclist '\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: computer_pwdnotreqd\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: objectcategory=\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: -subnets -f\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: name=\"Domain Admins\"\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: '-sc u:'\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: domainncs\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: dompol\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: ' oudmp '\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: subnetdmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: gpodmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: fspdmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: users_noexpire\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: computers_active\nrespond:\n- action: report\n metadata:\n author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps)\n description: AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used\n to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.\n falsepositives:\n - Admin activity\n level: high\n references:\n - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/\n - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/\n - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/\n tags:\n - attack.discovery\n - attack.t1482\n - attack.t1018\n name: AdFind Usage Detection\n\n"
}
CURL Example:
curl -X POST https://sigma.limacharlie.io/convert/rule -H 'content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data-urlencode "rule@my-rule-file.yaml"
Multiple Rules¶
Endpoint: https://sigma.limacharlie.io/convert/repo
Verb: POST
Form Parameters:
-
repo: the source where to access the rules to convert, one of: -
An HTTPS link to a direct resource like:
https://corp.com/my-rules.yaml -
A GitHub link to a file or repo like:
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ad_find_discovery.ymlhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation- An Authenticated Resource Locator
target: optional target within LimaCharlie, one ofedr(default) orartifact.
Output Example:
{
"rules":[
{
"file":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ad_find_discovery.yml","rule":"detect:\n events:\n - NEW_PROCESS\n - EXISTING_PROCESS\n op: and\n rules:\n - op: is windows\n - op: or\n rules:\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: domainlist\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: trustdmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: dcmodes\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: adinfo\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: ' dclist '\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: computer_pwdnotreqd\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: objectcategory=\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: -subnets -f\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: name=\"Domain Admins\"\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: '-sc u:'\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: domainncs\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: dompol\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: ' oudmp '\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: subnetdmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: gpodmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: fspdmp\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: users_noexpire\n - case sensitive: false\n op: contains\n path: event/COMMAND_LINE\n value: computers_active\nrespond:\n- action: report\n metadata:\n author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps)\n description: AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used\n to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.\n falsepositives:\n - Admin activity\n level: high\n references:\n - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/\n - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/\n - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/\n tags:\n - attack.discovery\n - attack.t1482\n - attack.t1018\n name: AdFind Usage Detection\n\n"
},
...
]
}
CURL Example: